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A Party Can Not Appeal from a Portion of an Order Where the Party Is Not Aggrieved by the Order

The Second Department noted that a party can not appeal from a portion of an order which does not grant relief the party did not request, even where the order includes reasoning with which the party does not agree:

“A party is not aggrieved by an order which does not grant relief [he or she] did not request” … . “Merely because the order appealed from contains language or reasoning that a party deems adverse to its interests does not furnish a basis for standing to take an appeal'” … . Here, the plaintiffs are not aggrieved by so much of the order as, in denying the … defendants’ motion for summary judgment and reaching a result which was not adverse to the plaintiffs, determined that a prior judgment did not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect on the motion before it … . Since the plaintiffs are not aggrieved by the portion of the order from which they appeal, their appeal must be dismissed. Spielman v Mehraban, 2013 NY Slip Op 02565, 2011-10855, Index No 19056/10, 2nd Dept, 4-17-13

 

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