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PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROPERLY DENIED, BUT COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, modifying Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for a preliminary injunction was properly denied, but Supreme Court should not have dismissed the complaint sua sponte. The underlying action sought a declaratory judgment that plaintiff was the owner of shares of stock allocated to a cooperative apartment. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction in the pending holdover proceeding:

To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable injury absent a preliminary injunction, and (3) that the equities balance in his or her favor (see CPLR 6301…). “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction lies within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” … . Here, the plaintiff did not sustain his burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits.

However, inasmuch as there was neither notice to the parties by the Supreme Court nor an application by the defendant seeking dismissal, it was error for the court to, sua sponte, direct the dismissal of the complaint in this action … . Gonzalez v 231 Maujer St., HDFC, 2018 NY Slip Op 00412, Second Dept 1-24-18

CIVIL PROCEDURE (SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROPERLY DENIED, BUT COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE (SECOND DEPT))/SUA SPONTE (DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROPERLY DENIED, BUT COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED SUA SPONTE (SECOND DEPT))

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