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ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WHEN HE STARTED THE LAWSUIT ASSERTING DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION, HE LOST STANDING TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUIT AFTER WITHDRAWING HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE LLC (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the causes of action brought by a minority shareholder in a limited liability company (LLC) were derivative in nature. The complaint was filed in 2012 and plaintiff withdrew from the LLC in 2015. Therefore plaintiff lacked standing to sue:

[Plaintiff] first cause of action sought an accounting, his second cause of action sought damages for breach of fiduciary duty, his third cause of action sought the appointment of a receiver … , his fourth cause of action sought the imposition of a constructive trust, and his fifth cause of action was to recover damages for waste. …

“[M]embers of a limited liability company (LLC) may bring derivative suits on the LLC’s behalf” … . In a derivative suit, “[t]he remedy sought is for wrong done to the corporation; the primary cause of action belongs to the corporation; [and] recovery must enure to the benefit of the corporation”… . In the context of a corporation, “the standing of the shareholder is based on the fact that . . . he [or she] is defending his [or her] own interests as well as those of the corporation” … . “Where the plaintiff voluntarily disposes of the stock, his [or her] rights as a shareholder cease, and his [or her] interest in the litigation is terminated. Being a stranger to the corporation, the former stockowner lacks standing to institute or continue the suit” … . The same is true in the context of an LLC. In order to maintain a derivative cause of action, a plaintiff must be a member of the LLC … . Thus, the Supreme Court properly held that, once the plaintiff withdrew from WIC, he lost standing to maintain any derivative causes of action on behalf of the company, notwithstanding his possible right to a future payment for the value of his membership interest upon his withdrawal … . Jacobs v Cartalemi, 2017 NY Slip Op 08506, Second Dept 12-6-17

CORPORATION LAW (LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WHEN HE STARTED THE LAWSUIT ASSERTING DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION, HE LOST STANDING TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUIT AFTER WITHDRAWING HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE LLC (SECOND DEPT))/LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW (DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WHEN HE STARTED THE LAWSUIT ASSERTING DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION, HE LOST STANDING TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUIT AFTER WITHDRAWING HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE LLC (SECOND DEPT))/DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS (LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY LAW, ALTHOUGH PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) WHEN HE STARTED THE LAWSUIT ASSERTING DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION, HE LOST STANDING TO CONTINUE WITH THE SUIT AFTER WITHDRAWING HIS MEMBERSHIP IN THE LLC (SECOND DEPT))

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