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CONTRACT PROVISION ABOUT ALLOWED USES OF THE DIOCESE’S PROPERTY BY A CATHOLIC SCHOOL WAS AMBIGUOUS, DIOCESE’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SEEKING DAMAGES FOR BREACH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined a contract provision about the use of property by a Catholic school (CTK) was ambiguous about other allowed uses (daycare, charter school, etc.) and therefore the plaintiff's (the Diocese's) motion for summary judgment should not have been granted:

It cannot be said that the language of the 1976 Agreement requiring CTK to “maintain and operate a Catholic high school in and upon the entire premises herein described and . . . use the same for no other purpose not customarily or usually associated with such use” has ” a definite and precise meaning, unattended by danger of misconception in the purport of the [agreement] itself, and concerning which there is no reasonable basis for a difference of opinion,'” particularly given the time that has passed and the changes in circumstances since the negotiation of the 1976 Agreement… . CTK came forward with evidence of other instances where unused or underused portions of Catholic schools were rented to charter schools, raising a triable issue of fact as to whether such a use is customarily and usually associated with the operation of a Catholic school under the budgetary and enrollment constraints currently facing schools within the Diocese. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, N.Y. v Christ the King Regional High Sch., 2018 NY Slip Op 06130, Second Dept 9-19-18

CONTRACT LAW (CONTRACT PROVISION ABOUT ALLOWED USES OF THE DIOCESE'S PROPERTY BY A CATHOLIC SCHOOL WAS AMBIGUOUS, DIOCESE'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SEEKING DAMAGES FOR BREACH SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT))

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