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No Basis for Liability of Snow-Removal Contractor Re: Slip and Fall

The Second Department determined a snow-removal contractor was properly granted summary judgment in a slip and fall case.  The plaintiff did not raise a question of fact about any of the three “Espinal” [98 NY2d 136] situations (which would allow recovery against a contractor with whom plaintiff does not have a contractual relationship):

The Court of Appeals has recognized three situations in which a party such as the defendant may be said to have assumed a duty of care, and thus potentially may be liable in tort to third persons such as the plaintiff: (1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his or her duties, launches a force or instrument of harm, (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party’s duties, and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced another party’s duty to maintain the premises safely … . * * *

…[T]he plaintiff offered only speculation and conjecture in support of her contention that the defendant launched a force or instrument of harm by creating or exacerbating the ice patch that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s fall …, or that the subject snow removal contract was a comprehensive and exclusive agreement which displaced Communicar’s duty to maintain the premises in a safe condition … . Javid v Sclafmore Constr, 2014 NY Slip Op 03656, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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