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PROPERTY OWNER’S [EMPLOYER’S] COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK NOT TRIGGERED BY INJURY WHEN DRAWING UP AN ESTIMATE.

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant property-owner was not entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiff was on the property to provide an estimate of the cost of repair of defendant’s porch when the porch collapsed. Defendant argued she could not be liable because the injury occurred when plaintiff was doing work he was hired to do. However, the plaintiff had not been hired to repair the porch:

Employers have a common-law duty to provide their employees with a safe place to work … . The duty, however, does not extend to hazards that are part of, or inherent in, the very work the employee is to perform or defects the employee is hired to repair … . Here, the defendant failed to establish her prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, as the evidence submitted in support of her motion showed that the plaintiff merely went to the premises to prepare an estimate to repair the back porch. The plaintiff had not been hired to repair the back porch and he was not engaged in any repair work when the incident allegedly occurred… . Arcabascio v Bentivegna, 2016 NY Slip Op 06187, 2nd Dept 9-28-16

NEGLIGENCE (PROPERTY OWNER’S [EMPLOYER’S] COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK NOT TRIGGERED BY INJURY WHEN PROVIDING AN ESTIMATE)/LABOR-CONSTRUCTION LAW (PROPERTY OWNER’S [EMPLOYER’S] COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK NOT TRIGGERED BY INJURY WHEN PROVIDING AN ESTIMATE)/EMPLOYMENT LAW (PROPERTY OWNER’S [EMPLOYER’S] COMMON LAW DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK NOT TRIGGERED BY INJURY WHEN PROVIDING AN ESTIMATE)

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THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS SENT TO DEFENDANT IN AN ENVELOPE WHICH INCLUDED OTHER NOTICES, A VIOLATION OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
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