You are here: / / Portion of Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) Order Not Supported by Testimony...

Portion of Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) Order Not Supported by Testimony Should Not Have Been Included

The Second Department determined Supreme Court did not have the authority, under Mental Hygiene Law 9.60, to go beyond the treatment plan and recommendations testified about by the psychiatrist in a proceeding to order Raymond G to comply with Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT).  In the absence of any recommendations about Raymond G’s use of his car, the court ordered the impoundment of his car. The Second Department reversed that part of the AOT order and explained what can be included in an AOT order under the terms of the controlling statute:

Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60, commonly known as Kendra’s Law, “provides a framework for the judicial authorization of involuntary outpatient treatment programs for persons suffering from mental illnesses” (Matter of William C., 64 AD3d 277, 279). It sets forth, inter alia, the types of outpatient services that may be ordered by the court as part of an AOT plan, the requirements for the petition, and the procedures for a hearing on the petition (see Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[a][1]; [e][2]-[3]; [h][1]). * * *

The statute requires that the petition be accompanied by an affirmation or affidavit of an examining physician who recommends AOT (see Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[e][3][I]), and directs that the court “shall not order [AOT]” unless it is provided with a proposed written treatment plan developed by a physician appointed by the applicable community services or hospital director, which includes “all categories of services, as set forth in [§ 9.60(a)(1)], which such physician recommends that the [patient] receive,” “no later than the date of the hearing on the petition” (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[i][1]). Further, the statute provides that the court “shall not order [AOT] unless [the] physician appearing on behalf of [the] director testifies to explain the written proposed treatment plan [and] state[s] the categories of [AOT] recommended, the rationale for each such category, [and] facts which establish that such treatment is the least restrictive alternative” (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[i][3]).

Following the hearing, the court “may” order AOT if it finds by “clear and convincing evidence that the [patient] meets the criteria for [AOT], and there is no appropriate and feasible less restrictive alternative” (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[j][2]). The order must include specific findings “by clear and convincing evidence that the proposed treatment is the least restrictive treatment appropriate and feasible for the [patient],” and “state an [AOT] plan, which shall include all categories of [AOT], as set forth in [§ 9.60(a)(1)], which the [patient] is to receive” (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[j][2]). The order “shall not include any such category that has not been recommended in both the proposed written treatment plan and the [physician’s hearing] testimony” (Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60[j][2]).  Matter of Raymond G…, 2014 NY Slip Op 05183, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

You might also like
Response to Sex Offender Treatment Program Must Be “Exceptional” to Warrant Downward Departure (SORA)
Criteria for Evaluating County Bidding Process Explained
Defendant Did Not Forfeit His Right to Counsel by Making Four Applications for Reassignment of Assigned Counsel/Evidence of Burglary and Criminal Mischief Insufficient–Possession of Stolen Items Not Enough
A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGING USE OF A PERSON’S IMAGE IN ADVERTISING IS PURELY STATUTORY (CIVIL RIGHTS LAW 50 AND 51); THERE IS NO COMMON-LAW RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN NEW YORK (SECOND DEPT).
Civil Contempt Does Not Include the Element of Willfulness/Adverse Inference May Be Drawn Re: Assertion of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Contempt Proceeding
DEFENSE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES TO WHITE JURORS NOT SUPPORTED BY RACE-NEUTRAL REASONS; THE ALLEGED ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE WAS NOT PRESERVED (SECOND DEPT).
YELLOWSTONE INJUNCTION NOT WARRANTED IN THIS LEASE-TERMINATION CASE, PLAINTIFF NIGHTCLUB DID NOT DEMONSTRATE ITS WILLINGNESS TO CURE AN ALLEGED NOISE-LEVEL VIOLATION OF THE LEASE (SECOND DEPT). ​
IN THIS DIVORCE ACTION SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPUTING TOO MUCH INCOME TO AND AWARDING TOO LITTLE MAINTENANCE TO PLAINTIFF WIFE; IN ADDITION DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED 50% OF THE VALUE OF PLAINTIFF’S BUSINESS AND THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ORDERED A POSTTRIAL VALUATION OF THE BUSINESS (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Block Falling from Pallet Covered Under Labor Law 240(1)/Criteria for Common... Matter Determined After a Public Hearing, As Opposed to a Quasi-Judicial Evidentiary...