You are here: / / THE ZONE OF DANGER THEORY OF LIABILITY IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE IMMEDIATE...
, , , ,

THE ZONE OF DANGER THEORY OF LIABILITY IS AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE IMMEDIATE RELATIVES OF THE INJURED PARTY; PETITIONERS’ CHILDREN WITNESSED THE FATAL INJURY TO ANOTHER STUDENT WHO WAS NOT RELATED; PETITIONERS’ REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A LATE NOTICE OF CLAIM AGAINST THE SCHOOL DISTRICT ALLEGING INTENTIONAL AND NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the petition for leave to file a late notice of claim against the school district should not have been granted. The petitioners are the parents of students who were participating in football training when the pole or log they were carrying dropped and fatally injured another student. The late notice of claim asserted intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress based upon the petitioners’ children being in the “zone of danger.” However, the “zone of danger” theory can be raised only by the immediate relatives of the injured party:

“The zone-of-danger rule . . . allows one who is himself or herself threatened with bodily harm in consequence of the defendant’s negligence to recover for emotional distress resulting from viewing the death or serious physical injury of a member of his or her immediate family” … . Here, the petitioners’s children were not immediate family members of the decedent. Thus, they have no legally cognizable claim to recover damages for emotional distress they allegedly sustained from witnessing the accident … , or based upon the District’s alleged refusal to provide continued counseling and maintain the coaching staff support system, as such damages are a financial consequence of their emotional trauma … . Moreover, the District demonstrated that, under the circumstances presented, it was not authorized to pay for continued outside counseling services for the petitioners’ children, and the record reflects that the District provided ongoing counseling from mental health professionals employed by the District. Under the circumstances, the proposed claim against the District is patently meritless … . Matter of Kmiotek v Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist., 2019 NY Slip Op 07583, Second Dept 10-23-19

 

You might also like
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PLEA OFFER, RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT DEFENDANT ACCEPTED THE PLEA OFFER TO MAKE SURE HIS BAIL WOULD NOT BE INCREASED; DEFENDANT WAS WORRIED ABOUT BEING ABLE TO FIND CARE FOR HIS THREE-YEAR-OLD SON; BAIL SHOULD NOT BE A CONSIDERATION IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS; THE MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE PLEA SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED WITHOUT A HEARING (FIRST DEPT).
PEOPLE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE VICTIM’S AGE, FACTOR 7 SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN APPLIED TO THE RISK ASSESSMENT.
DESIGNATING ATTORNEY AS STANDBY COUNSEL WAS INSUFFICIENT, DEFENDANT’S REFUSAL TO BE REPRESENTED BY THE SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL WHO APPEARED FOR SENTENCING REQUIRED THE COURT TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO BE SURE THE DEFENDANT UNDERSTOOD THE CONSEQUENCES OF REPRESENTING HIMSELF (SECOND DEPT).
THE MOTION COURT IN THIS REAR-END TRAFFIC-ACCIDENT CASE SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED THE CERTIFIED BUT UNSIGNED DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANT; DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL OF THE CROSS-CLAIMS (SECOND DEPT). ​
ALTHOUGH THE PARTY TWICE FILED FOR BANKRUPTCY WITHOUT LISTING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AS AN ASSET, THE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REOPENED AND THE ACTION WAS ADDED AS AN ASSET; AT THAT POINT THE BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE BECAME THE PLAINTIFF IN THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL, BASED UPON THE PARTY’S INITIAL FAILURE TO LIST THE ACTION AS AN ASSET, DID NOT APPLY TO THE TRUSTEE (SECOND DEPT).
Questions of Fact Whether Infant-Plaintiff’s Injury at the Hands of Other Students Was Proximately Caused by Negligent Supervision and/or Negligent Hiring and/or Retention
DEFENDANT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LOAN WAS ORALLY CONVERTED TO A GIFT BY DECEDENT, CRITERIA FOR PROOF OF A GIFT EXPLAINED.
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY PROTECTED STATE FROM SUIT ALLEGING INADEQUATE HIGHWAY GUARDRAIL.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

MOTHER’S CUSTODY PETITION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED WITHOUT A HEARING;... THE INSURED, WHO WAS SEEKING UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, DID NOT TIMELY NOTIFY...