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Matter Determined After a Public Hearing, As Opposed to a Quasi-Judicial Evidentiary Hearing, Is Reviewed Under the “Arbitrary and Capricious,” Not “Substantial Evidence,” Standard/Village’s Higher Rate for Water Delivered to Customers Outside Its Borders Was Rational

The Second Department determined that, because there was a public hearing, not a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing, on whether the village could charge a higher rate for water supplied outside its borders, Supreme Court should have determined the matter under the arbitrary and capricious standard. In applying that standard, the Second Department found the higher rate had a rational basis:

The Supreme Court erred in characterizing the proceeding as one in the nature of certiorari in which the “substantial evidence” inquiry applied (CPLR 7804[g]). Rate-making determinations may be considered “judicial in the sense that they are reviewable by certiorari or a proceeding in the nature of certiorari” where notice and a hearing are prescribed by statute … . However, “there are different types of hearings with different legal consequences” … . Here, the Village Code required the Board to conduct a hearing in advance of changing the rates it charged for water service, and the Board held a public hearing, as opposed to a quasi-judicial evidentiary hearing (see Code of the Village of Williston Park § 225-20[A]). As such, judicial review of the determination was limited to “whether the determination was affected by an error of law, or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion, or was irrational” … . * * *

The Board’s determination to increase rates was rational, and was not arbitrary and capricious or illegal. A municipal water supplier may charge a higher rate to customers outside its borders, including other municipalities, so long as the difference has a rational basis … . Moreover, a municipal corporation operating a public water utility is entitled to earn a “fair return” on its investment in the utility’s facilities “over and above costs of operation and necessary and proper reserves” in addition to “an amount equivalent to taxes which [the utility], if privately owned, would pay to such municipal corporation” (General Municipal Law § 94; see NY Const art IX, § 1[f]). The actual rate the Board determined to charge also was rational … . In addition, the petitioner has not made any showing that the profits earned by the Incorporated Village of Williston Park under the new rate schedule, as compared to the “value of the property used and useful in such public utility service, over and above costs of operation and necessary and proper reserves,” were in excess of a “fair return” … . Matter of Board of Trustees of Inc Vil of Williston v Board of Trustees of Inc Vil of Williston Park, 2014 NY Slip Op 05179, 2nd Dept 7-9-14

 

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