You are here: / / Starbuck’s Tip-Splitting Policy Analyzed
,

Starbuck’s Tip-Splitting Policy Analyzed

The Second Circuit asked the Court of Appeals to answer certified questions about how the Labor Law relates to a tip-splitting policy used by Starbucks.  Over two dissents, the Court of Appeals determined, under the Labor Law, limited supervisory duties did not mandate exclusion from the tip pool:

Starbucks maintains a written policy governing the collection, storage and distribution of customer tips. Pursuant to this policy, each Starbucks store places a plexiglass container at the counter where patrons may deposit tips. Once these tip canisters become full, Starbucks requires that they be emptied into a bag and the money is stored in a safe. At the end of each week, the tips are tallied and distributed in cash to two categories of employees — baristas and shift supervisors — in proportion to the number of hours each employee worked. Starbucks does not permit its assistant store managers or store managers to share in the weekly distribution of tips. The company’s decision to include shift supervisors in these tip pools was the impetus for the first lawsuit before us, while its exclusion of assistant store managers underlies the claims in the second action. * * *

…[A]n employee whose personal service to patrons is a principal or regular part of his or her duties may participate in an employer-mandated tip allocation arrangement under Labor Law § 196-d, even if that employee possesses limited supervisory responsibilities. But an employee granted meaningful authority or control over subordinates can no longer be considered similar to waiters and busboys within the meaning of section 196-d and, consequently, is not eligible to participate in a tip pool. * * *

…Starbucks’ decision to exclude assistant store managers from the tip pool is not contrary to Labor Law § 196-d.  Barenboim, et al v Starbucks Corporation, No 122, CtApp 6-26-13

 

You might also like
Appellate Review of Conviction Based Upon Circumstantial Evidence Explained
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY HANDLED A JUROR’S CLAIM THAT OTHER JURORS HAD EXHIBITED RACIAL BIAS DURING DELIBERATIONS AND PROPERLY DENIED THE DEFENSE REQUEST FOR A MISTRIAL; THERE WAS A COMPREHENSIVE DISSENT (CT APP).
THE SECOND DEPARTMENT HAD REVERSED DEFENDANT’S MURDER CONVICTION, STATING IT WAS REVERSING ON WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE GROUNDS FOR THE SAME REASONS IT WAS REVERSING ON LEGAL SUFFICIENCY GROUNDS; THAT CONSTITUTED AN ERROR OF LAW REVIEWABLE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS; THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THERE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CONVICTION; THE MATTER WAS REMITTED FOR PROPER ASSESSMENT OF THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE (CT APP).
Defendant Should Not Have Been Denied His Right to Testify Before the Grand Jury Because He Struck Out Waiver Provisions Not Required by Statute
APPELLATE DIVISION WRONGLY EXTENDED COMMON INTEREST ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO MERGER NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THERE WAS NO PENDING LITIGATION.
TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL THE PLAINTIFF MUST DEMONSTRATE (1) THE OWNERS EXERCISED COMPLETE DOMINATION OF THE CORPORATION WITH RESPECT TO THE TRANSACTION AT ISSUE AND (2) THE DOMINATION WAS USED TO COMMIT A FRAUD OR WRONG AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF; HERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THE TRANSACTION AT ISSUE WAS FRAUDULENT (CT APP).
VALIDITY OF STREET STOPS PRESENTS A MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT WHICH THE COURT OF APPEALS CAN REVIEW ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF WHETHER THE LOWER COURT RULING HAS SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, HERE THE RECORD SUPPORTED THE VALIDITY OF THE STOPS UNDER DE BOUR, TRIAL COURT’S FAILURE TO CREATE A RECORD CONCERNING TWO JURY NOTES REQUIRED REVERSAL HOWEVER (CT APP).
THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY REQUIRED WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANY ASSIGNMENT OF THE POLICY; THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN NOTICE PRECLUDED THE ASSIGNEE FROM BRINGING A CLAIM UNDER THE POLICY AGAINST THE INSURER (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Closure of Railroad Crossing Did Not Constitute a Taking of Claimant’s La... Motion for Default Judgment Should Have Been Denied; Motion to Compel Acceptance...