You are here: / / A Forged Deed Is Void Ab Initio and Any Encumbrance on Real Property Based...
, ,

A Forged Deed Is Void Ab Initio and Any Encumbrance on Real Property Based Upon a Forged Deed Is Null and Void—Action Based Upon a Forged Deed Is Not Therefore Subject to the Six-Year Statute of Limitations for Fraud

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a three-judge dissent, determined that a forged deed is void ab initio and neither a forged deed nor a mortgage interest based upon a forged deed is valid at any time.  Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations for fraud does not apply and the action was not time-barred: “The legal question raised in this appeal is whether plaintiff … is time-barred under CPLR 213 (8) from seeking to set aside and cancel, as null and void, defendant Bank of America's mortgage interest in real property conveyed on the authority of a forged deed. Under our prior case law it is well-settled that a forged deed is void ab initio, meaning a legal nullity at its inception. As such, any encumbrance upon real property based on a forged deed is null and void. Therefore, the statute of limitations set forth in CPLR 213 (8) does not foreclose plaintiff's claim against defendant. ” Faison v Lewis. 2015 NY Slip Op 04026, CtApp 5-12-15

 

You might also like
ALTHOUGH A DEFENDANT CAN PROPERLY REQUEST A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FROM THE SORA RISK-LEVEL ASSESSMENT BASED ON HIS “RELEASE ENVIRONMENT.” I.E., GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT, STRONG FAMILY SUPPORT, ETC., THE DEFENDANT MUST DEMONSTRATE THE “RELEASE ENVIRONMENT” WAS NOT ADEQUATELY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY THE GUIDELINES AND HIS “RELEASE ENVIRONMENT” REDUCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF REOFFENDING (CT APP).
THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE THAT THE INITIAL ‘PARTIAL’ ARBITRATION AWARD WAS A FINAL AWARD; THEREFORE THE ARBITRATORS HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REVISIT THE MATTER AND ISSUE A VALID FINAL AWARD (CT APP).
Whether Plaintiff “Justifiably Relied” on Alleged Misrepresentations Is Not Generally a Question Which Can Be Resolved in a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Cause of Action
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN COURT OF APPEALS FOR MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT REQUIRED AFFIRMANCE OF DENIAL OF SUPPRESSION MOTION.
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 230 DOES NOT CREATE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR MALICIOUS REPORTING OF INSURANCE FRAUD BY A PHYSICIAN TO THE OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL MEDICAL CONDUCT (CT APP).
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE SURRENDER AGREEMENT THE TENANT OWED THE LANDLORD AN ADDITIONAL $175,000; UPON DEFENDANT’S DEFAULT, THE PLAINTIFF SUED FOR THE CONTRACTUAL LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF OVER $1,000,000; THE JUDGMENT FOR $175,000 WAS UPHELD; THE LIQUIDATED DAMAGES OF OVER $1,000,000 VIOLATED THE PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST NON-STATUTORY PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES (CT APP).
Failure to Request Adverse Inference Jury Instruction Re: Missing Material Evidence, Under the Facts, Did Not Constitute Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
THE ROADBLOCK VEHICLE-STOP WAS VALID; THE SEARCH BASED UPON AN ODOR OF MARIJUANA WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN VALID UNDER THE MARIHUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION ACT (MRTA) BUT THE COURT REFUSED TO APPLY THE MRTA RETROACTIVELY; ONE DISSENT ARGUED DEFENDANT’S CHALLENGE TO PROHIBITING FELONS FROM OBTAINING GUN LICENSES HAD MERIT; THE OTHER DISSENT ARGUED THE ROADBLOCK PROCEDURE WAS NOT DEMONSTRATED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL (CT APP). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Denial of Petitioner’s Application for Employment as a School-Bus Driver,... “Bankruptcy” Exclusion in a Political Risk Insurance Policy Applied—Insurer...