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THE PARTIES DID NOT AGREE THAT THE INITIAL ‘PARTIAL’ ARBITRATION AWARD WAS A FINAL AWARD; THEREFORE THE ARBITRATORS HAD THE AUTHORITY TO REVISIT THE MATTER AND ISSUE A VALID FINAL AWARD (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Stein, reversing the Appellate Division, determined the arbitrators had the power to revisit a “partial final award” and issue a valid final award. The Appellate Division had held the doctrine of functus officio prohibited the arbitrators from revisiting the initial award:

… [T]he Appellate Division held, that the arbitration panel exceeded its authority because it violated the common law doctrine of functus officio … . Functus officio, Latin for “having performed [one’s] office” … , has operated historically as a restriction on the authority of arbitrators, precluding them from taking additional actions after issuing a final award. As this Court stated well over one hundred years ago, “[a]s soon as [the arbitrators] have made and delivered their award, they become functus officio, and their power is at an end. After having once fully exercised their judgment upon the facts submitted to them and reached a conclusion which they have incorporated into their award, they are not at liberty at another and subsequent time to exercise a fresh judgment on the case and alter their award” … . * * *

This Court has not had occasion to determine whether or under what circumstances parties may agree to the issuance of a final award that disposes of some, but not all, of the issues submitted to the arbitrators; nor must we resolve that question in this case. Even assuming that parties to an arbitration may agree to the issuance of a partial determination that constitutes a final award, the parties here, as the arbitration panel below concluded, did not reach any such agreement. American Intl. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v Corporation, 2020 NY Slip Op 02529, Second Dept 4-30-20

 

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