You are here: / / JUDGE MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO TREAT AN ELIGIBLE YOUTH AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER,...

JUDGE MUST DECIDE WHETHER TO TREAT AN ELIGIBLE YOUTH AS A YOUTHFUL OFFENDER, EVEN WHEN THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASK THE JUDGE TO DO SO (CT APP)

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, over a concurring opinion and a two-judge dissent, determined that a judge must consider whether an eligible youth should be treated as a youthful offender, even where the defendant makes no request to do so:

CPL 720.20 (1) says that, where a defendant is eligible to be treated as a youthful offender, the sentencing court “must” determine whether he or she is to be so treated. We hold that compliance with this statutory command cannot be dispensed with, even where defendant has failed to ask to be treated as a youthful offender, or has purported to waive his or her right to [*2]make such a request. In so holding, we overrule People v McGowen (42 NY2d 905 [1977]). * * *

We read the legislature’s use of the word “must” in this context to reflect a policy choice that there be a youthful offender determination in every case where the defendant is eligible, even where the defendant fails to request it, or agrees to forgo it as part of a plea bargain. Ordinarily, of course, defendants may choose to give up their rights, even very important ones, and indeed are deemed to have done so if they do not timely assert them. But this right—not a right to receive youthful offender treatment, but to have a court decide whether such treatment is justified—is different. To disable a court from making that decision is effectively to hold that the defendant may not have the opportunity for a fresh start, without a criminal record, even if the judge would conclude that that opportunity is likely to turn the young offender into a law-abiding, productive member of society.

The judgment of a court as to which young people have a real likelihood of turning their lives around is just too valuable, both to the offender and to the community, to be sacrificed in plea bargaining. Of course there will be many cases in which the interests of the community demand that youthful offender treatment be denied, and that the young offender be sentenced like any other criminal; indeed, there will be cases in which that is obviously the right course—but the court must make the decision in every case. Where the court’s ruling is a foregone conclusion, no purpose is served by a plea bargain that takes the decision out of the court’s hands. People v Rudolph, 2013 NY Slip Op 04840 [21 NY3d 497], CtApp 6-27-13

 

 

You might also like
No Preservation Required to Review Validity of Guilty Plea and Immediate Sentencing In Absence of the Waiver of the Rights to a Jury Trial, to Confront Witnesses and to Avoid Self-Incrimination
ALTHOUGH THE BUILDING IS OWNED BY A NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH RAISES FUNDS FOR HEALTHCARE SERVICES, THE BUILDING IS LEASED TO A FOR-PROFIT CORPORATION WHICH PROVIDES DIALYSIS; THE LEASED BUILDING, THEREFORE IS NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAX PURSUANT TO RPTL 420-A (CT APP).
Closure of Railroad Crossing Did Not Constitute a Taking of Claimant’s Land
No Appeal to the Court of Appeals Lies from the Appellate Division’s Affirmance of the Denial of Resentencing Pursuant to the 2004 Drug Law Reform Act (DLRA)
Criteria for Punitive Damages Award
THE FOIL REQUIREMENT THAT THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS BE “REASONABLY DESCRIBED” IS DISTINCT FROM THE ABILITY TO RETRIEVE THE DOCUMENTS WITH “REASONABLE EFFORT;” THE TWO STANDARDS SHOULD NOT BE CONFLATED; HERE THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION’S PROFESSED INABILTY TO RETRIEVE THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS DOES NOT DETERMINE WHETHER THE REQUESTED DOCUMENTS WERE “REASONABLY DESCRIBED;” MATTER REMANDED (CT APP).
GENERAL BUSINESS LAW CAUSES OF ACTION ALLEGING DECEPTIVE PRACTICES AND FALSE ADVERTISING WERE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED AGAINST AN INSURER PROVIDING HEALTH INSURANCE TO NEW YORK CITY EMPLOYEES; PLAINTIFF, A RETIRED POLICE OFFICER, ALLEGED DECEPTIVE AND FALSE MARKETING BY THE INSURER INDUCED HIM TO CHOOSE THE INSURER’S PLAN (CT APP).
Defendant’s Conviction Properly Reversed Because the Verdict Was Inconsistent/Repugnant—Charge Which Was the Subject of Conviction in the Inconsistent/Repugnant Verdict Can Be Presented to a New Grand Jury

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DOCTOR INTENTIONALLY LEFT A GUIDE WIRE USED DURING SURGERY INSIDE PLAINTIFF’S... THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE...