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“Outing” Confidential Informant Online Constituted Witness Tampering

The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction for fourth-degree witness tampering.  Defendant was present when a confidential informant purchased drugs from defendant's companion.  The transaction was videotaped.  Defendant put the surveillance tape online and identified the confidential informant on his Facebook page.  Statements on the Facebook page by the defendant and others included warnings such as “Snitches get stiches:”

The evidence, seen in the light most favorable to the People, is sufficient to establish that defendant knew that the confidential informant might testify in a proceeding, and that he wrongfully sought to stop her from doing so. After learning about Jackson's arrest and the confidential informant's role as a witness against Jackson and, potentially, himself, defendant immediately posted communications on the internet that the jury might have reasonably inferred were coded threats that were intended to induce the confidential informant not to testify. And in addition to the public postings on Facebook and YouTube, defendant was in contact via Facebook messages (which essentially act as email on the website) with the confidential informant and her mother. People v Horton, 2014 NY Slip Op 07088, Ct.App. 07088, CtApp 10-21-14

 

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