You are here: / / Admission Into Evidence of Nontestifying Codefendant’s Grand Jury...
, ,

Admission Into Evidence of Nontestifying Codefendant’s Grand Jury Testimony Violated Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation

The First Department reversed defendant’s conviction, finding that the admission into evidence of the codefendant’s grand jury testimony violated the rule announced in Bruton v US, 391 US 123:

Under Bruton v United States, “a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant” … . Since the rule only applies where the codefendant’s statement was “incriminating on its face, and [not where it] became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial” …, the question before us is whether the codefendant’s grand jury testimony was facially incriminating as to defendant, rather than incriminating only when linked to other evidence. * * *

Although the codefendant’s grand jury testimony was intended as an innocent explanation of the events surrounding the alleged robbery, and admitted no wrongdoing, nevertheless it was “facially incriminating” as to defendant within the meaning of Bruton.

The codefendant’s narrative placed defendant with the codefendant throughout the relevant events and, specifically referring to defendant approximately 40 times, described defendant’s conduct. Among other things, the statement recounted that, after defendant’s return to the codefendant’s car following an absence to “get food,” the alleged robbery victim (an undercover officer) appeared at the car window, asked where the “stuff” was, and dropped prerecorded buy money (the property allegedly stolen in the charged robbery) into the car. This narrative suffices to create an inference that defendant, while outside the codefendant’s vehicle, had purported to set up a deal for a sale of contraband that was to culminate in the vehicle, but did not fulfill the deal once he entered the vehicle.  People v Johnson, 2014 NY Slip Op 08765, 1st Dept 12-16-14

 

You might also like
DEED PROVIDED AS SECURITY FOR A DEBT CONSTITUTES A MORTGAGE TRIGGERING THE NEED FOR FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS UPON DEFAULT.
QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER GENERAL CONTRACTOR LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 240 (1) FOR PLAINTIFF’S FALL FROM A LADDER BASED ON CONTRACTUAL SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, AND QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LIABLE AS A STATUTORY AGENT OF THE OWNER (FIRST DEPT).
PETITIONER FIREFIGHTER WAS INJURED WHEN HE BECAME DEHYDRATED DURING TRAINING; HE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ACCIDENTAL DISABILITY RETIREMENT BENEFITS BECAUSE THE INJURY DID NOT OCCUR AS A RESULT OF AN UNEXPECTED EVENT (FIRST DEPT). ​
FAILURE TO ALLEGE THAT “BUT FOR” DEFENDANT ATTORNEY’S NEGLIGENCE PLAINTIFF WOULD HAVE PREVAILED REQUIRED DISMISSAL OF THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE COMPLAINT (FIRST DEPT).
STANDING ON THE TOP STEP OF AN A FRAME LADDER WAS NOT THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PLAINTIFF’S FALL; SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
Court Should Not Have Instructed the Jury on the Initial Aggressor Exception to the Justification Defense—No Evidence to Support the Exception
FATHER’S REQUEST FOR UNSUPERVISED VISITATION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DENIED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PENDING PERMANENT NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS.
REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS ABOUT AN UNSOLVED 1987 HOMICIDE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED; APPEAL FROM A NONFINAL ORDER ALLOWED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

In the Absence of Prejudice, a Notice of Lien May Be Amended to Correct a Misdescription... Criteria for Challenge to Prenuptial Agreement Not Met