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Statutory “Reckless Disregard” Standard in Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b) Applied to the Driver of a Town Truck—The Driver Was Using a Plow to Remove Water and Debris from a Road—Because the Driver Was Acting On His Own and Had Not Been Assigned to Remove the Water and Debris, the Question Raised on Appeal Was Whether the Driver Was Doing “Work” within the Meaning of Section 1103 (b) such that the Statutory Standard, as Opposed to the Ordinary Negligence Standard, Applied

The Fourth Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined the statutory “reckless disregard” standard of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b), not the ordinary negligence standard, applied to the actions of the driver of a town truck..  The driver, Grzybek,  was using a plow to remove water and debris from a service road.  The water sprayed onto the windshield of the truck, obstructing the driver’s vision and causing the driver to cross into an oncoming lane, striking plaintiffs’ vehicle. Because the driver was not assigned the task of removing water and debris from the road, the dissenters argued the driver was not engaged in “work” within the meaning of Vehicle and Traffic Law 1103 (b) and, therefore, the ordinary negligence standard, not the “reckless disregard” standard of section 1103 (b), applied:

…[T]he statute exempts “all [municipal] vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway’ . . . from the rules of the road” … . The statute does not state that it exempts only those vehicles engaged in “assigned” work. Plowing water and debris from a road is work, and that work is within the scope of Grzybek’s duties. Plaintiffs do not suggest otherwise. Rather, their contention is that the statute applies only when the vehicles are “performing their assigned work” and that Grzybek was not assigned to plow water and debris from the service road on the day of the accident. In our view, interpreting the statute as the dissent and plaintiffs suggest improperly adds language to the statute by qualifying the word “work.” It is not the function of this Court to usurp the power of the legislature and rewrite a clear and unambiguous statute. Aside from statutory exceptions not relevant herein, all municipal vehicles actually engaged in work are exempt from the rules of the road. Inasmuch as Grzybek’s vehicle was actually engaged in work, albeit unassigned work, the reckless disregard standard of care set forth in Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1103 (b) applies as a matter of law. * * *

…[W]e conclude that plaintiffs, in opposition to defendants’ cross motion, submitted evidence from which a jury could find that Grzybek “had intentionally committed an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious risk “that was so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow” and [did] so with conscious indifference to the outcome’ ” … . Gawron v Town of Cheektowaga, 2014 NY Slip Op 03051, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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