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Statute of Limitations Tolling Provisions Do Not Apply to Endangering the Welfare of a Child

In finding the count charging defendant with endangering the welfare of a child was time-barred, the Fourth Department noted that the tolling provision (starting the statute of limitations when the victim reaches the age of 18) does not apply to that offense:

The statute of limitations for that offense is two years (see CPL 30.10 [2] [c]), and the tolling provision of CPL 30.10 (3) (f) does not apply to that offense … . Although, as noted, defendant’s contention is unpreserved for our review, we exercise our power to address it as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and we modify the judgment accordingly … . People v Lomaglio, 2015 NY Slip Op 00181, 4th Dept 1-2-15

 

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