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Conviction Based Upon Plea Where Defendant Was Not Advised of the Period of Postrelease Supervision Is Unconstitutional for Predicate Felony Purposes—Catu Applied Retroactively

The First Department determined a 2002 conviction based upon a (pre-Catu) plea during which defendant was not advised of the period of postrelease supervision is unconstitutional for predicate felony purposes:

CPL 400.15(7)(b) provides: “A previous conviction . . . which was obtained in violation of the rights of the defendant under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States must not be counted in determining whether the defendant has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction” … . Because a conviction obtained in violation of Catu implicates rights under the federal Constitution as well as the state constitution (see Catu, 4 NY3d at 245 …), the court properly granted defendant’s CPL 440.20 motion and vacated his sentence as a second violent felony offender on the ground that his 2002 conviction could not be counted as a predicate felony under CPL 400.15(7)(b).

The underlying conviction preceded the Catu decision. However, contrary to the People’s contention, we find that the rule of law announced in Catu applies retroactively to pre-Catu convictions … . People v Smith, 2015 NY Slip Op 07565, 1st Dept 10-15-15

 

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