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DEFENSE COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO MOVE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE LEARNED AT TRIAL CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.

The First Department, over an extensive dissent, determined defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to reopen the suppression hearing. Defendant was convicted of burglary. A bag of tools was the subject of a suppression motion. At the suppression hearing, the police officer testified the bag was open at defendant’s feet. The suppression court ruled the “burglar’s tools” were properly seized under the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement. At trial, the building superintendent who stopped the defendant testified the bag was in defendant’s hand and closed when the police arrived. Based on that new information, defense counsel should have requested the reopening of the suppression hearing:

 

Under CPL 710.40(4), a suppression hearing may be reopened upon a showing that the defendant has discovered “additional pertinent facts” that “could not have [been] discovered with reasonable diligence before the determination of the motion.” Here, the additional facts were “pertinent” because the superintendent’s testimony, if credited, would have undermined the ruling that the tools were admissible because they were in plain view. This was not a minor or routine inconsistency; the superintendent’s version was completely at odds with a plain view theory. Any issue of whose recollection was most reliable should have been presented to the hearing court. People v Kindell, 2016 NY Slip Op 00027, 1st Dept 1-7-16

 

CRIMINAL LAW (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)/EVIDENCE (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)/ATTORNEYS (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)/INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE (FAILURE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASIED ON NEW EVIDENCE)/SUPPRESSION (INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO REOPEN SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE)

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