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Plaintiff Not Entitled to Summary Judgment—Plaintiff Could Not Demonstrate Plaintiff’s Interpretation of the Contract Was the Only Reasonable Interpretation (Rendering the Contract Ambiguous)

Plaintiff sued under a brokerage agreement alleging entitlement to a fee in connection with the sale of defendant’s property. By the terms of the agreement, no fee was owed if the property was sold to “a private party identified as James Walker.” Ultimately the property was sold to “James Walker,” but defendant alleged the buyer was not James Walker but was merely using the name as a pseudonym to protect his privacy. The Second Department determined plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because it could not be found as a matter of law that plaintiff’s interpretation of the contract was the only reasonable interpretation. The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

“The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent” … . “[A] written agreement that is complete, clear and unambiguous on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” … . “To determine whether a writing is unambiguous, language should not be read in isolation because the contract must be considered as a whole” … . If the language of the contract is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, the contract will be considered ambiguous … .

The threshold question of whether a contract is unambiguous, and the subsequent construction and interpretation of an unambiguous contract, are issues of law within the province of the court … . “[W]hen interpreting a contract, the court should arrive at a construction which will give fair meaning to all of the language employed by the parties to reach a practical interpretation of the expressions of the parties so that their reasonable expectations will be realized” … . Extrinsic and parol evidence of the parties’ intent may not be admitted to create ambiguity in a contract that is unambiguous on its face, but such evidence may be considered where a contract is determined to be ambiguous … .

* * * … [Here it] cannot be determined as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s interpretation … was the only reasonable interpretation … . NRT N.Y., LLC v Harding, 2015 NY Slip Op 06719, 2nd Dept 9-2-15

 

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