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A TREE IS NOT A “BUILDING OR STRUCTURE” WITHIN THE MEANING OF LABOR LAW 240 (1); THEREFORE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, INCURRED WHILE CUTTING A LIMB OFF A TREE, WAS NOT COVERED BY THE LABOR LAW (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined that plaintiff’s injury while he was cutting a tree was not covered by Labor Law 240 (1). Plaintiff, a county parks department employee, argued that the tree cutting and removal was part of a larger construction project, i.e., setting up a holiday light show:

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners and general contractors, and their agents, a nondelegable duty to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites” … . The statute “applies where an employee is engaged ‘in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure'” … . “[T]ree cutting and removal, in and of themselves, are not activities subject to Labor Law § 240(1). Those activities are generally excluded from statutory protection because a tree is not a building or structure, as contemplated by the statute but, rather, ‘a product of nature'” … .

Here, the defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by submitting evidence demonstrating that, at the time of his accident, the plaintiff was engaged in tree cutting and removal, which “constituted routine maintenance outside of a construction or renovation context” … . In support of its motion, the defendant submitted, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of James Leonard, the director of general maintenance for the Department, and Russell Argila, a senior maintenance mechanic in the general maintenance department. Leonard testified that, on the date of the accident, the plaintiff and his coworkers were engaged in “thinning out, pruning trees, dead branches along . . . [a] hillside,” and that the tree the plaintiff was cutting at the time of his accident was part of that work. Argila testified that the tree crew, of which the plaintiff was a member, was “coming up there to clean it up, to do their normal tree work,” and denied that the purpose of the tree work was to prepare for the installation of the [light show]. Peterkin v Westchester Parks Found., Inc., 2026 NY Slip Op 00268, Second Dept 1-21-26

Practice Point: Here tree cutting and removal was deemed “routine maintenance” which was not covered by Labor Law 240 (1) because a tree is not a “building of structure.”

 

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