You are here: / / ALTHOUGH THE RAISED PORTION OF THE SIDEWALK FLAG OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED...
,

ALTHOUGH THE RAISED PORTION OF THE SIDEWALK FLAG OVER WHICH PLAINTIFF TRIPPED DID NOT ABUT DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTY SEVERAL FEET OF THE FLAG EXTENDED IN FRONT OF DEFENDANTS’ PROPERTY; THE VILLAGE CODE MANDATES THAT ABUTTING PROPERTY OWNER’S MAINTAIN SIDEWALKS IN A SAFE CONDITION; DEFENDANTS DID NOT SUBMIT ANY EVIDENCE THAT THEY MAINTAINED THE ABUTTING PORTION OF THE SIDEWALK IN A SAFE CONDITION OR THAT ANY FAILURE TO DO SO WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S FALL (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the defendant homeowners were not entitled to summary judgment in this sidewalk slip and fall case. Apparently the raised part of a sidewalk flag over which plaintiff tripped was not in front of defendants’ property, but much of that same flag abutted defendants’ property. Because the village code placed responsibility on the homeowners to keep the sidewalk in a safe condition, in order to warrant summary judgment, the defendants were required to demonstrate they maintained the portion of the sidewalk in front of their property in a reasonable safe condition or that the failure to do so was not a proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall. Defendants offered no evidence on that issue:

While the homeowners demonstrated that the section of the sidewalk containing the defect on which the plaintiff allegedly tripped did not abut their property, their submissions in support of their motion also included evidence that the sidewalk flag on one side of the defect—which was not level with the adjacent flag, resulting in the height differential on which the plaintiff tripped—extended several feet onto their side of the property line. To meet their prima facie burden, the homeowners were “required to do more than simply demonstrate that the alleged defect was on another landowner’s property” … . They were required to make a prima facie showing that they maintained the portion of the sidewalk abutting their own property in a reasonably safe condition, or that any failure to do so was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries … . Kuritsky v Meshenberg, 2022 NY Slip Op 07066, Second Dept 12-14-22

Practice Point: Here the village code placed responsibility for maintaining sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition on the abutting property owners. The raised portion of a sidewalk flag over which plaintiff tripped was not in front of defendants’ property. But several feet of that same sidewalk flag extended in front of defendants’ property. To warrant summary the defendants were required to show either that they maintained the portion of the sidewalk which abutted their property in a reasonably safe condition, or that the failure to do so was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s fall. The defendants presented no evidence on the issue.

 

You might also like
“Filed Rate Doctrine” Precluded Lawsuit Alleging Unreasonable Premium
NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES IN THIS STUDENT-PUSHES-STUDENT CASE (SECOND DEPT).
THE TOWN PLANNING BOARD COMPLIED WITH THE “HARD LOOK” REQUIREMENTS OF SEQRA AND PROPERLY GRANTED A SPECIAL USE PERMIT, CRITERIA EXPLAINED IN SOME DETAIL (SECOND DEPT). ​
DEFENDANT’S ALLEGATION PLAINTIFF CAME TO A SUDDEN STOP IN THIS REAR-END COLLISION CASE DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT ABOUT DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY; HOWEVER A QUESTION OF FACT REMAINED CONCERNING DEFENDANT’S COMPARATIVE-NEGLIGENCE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFENDANTS DID NOT REQUEST THAT PLAINTIFFS GRANT A LICENSE FOR EXCAVATION WORK NEXT DOOR TO PLAINTIFFS’ BUILDING; NYC BUILDING CODE 3309.4 IMPOSES STRICT LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SUCH EXCAVATION WORK; OVERRULING PRECEDENT, PLAINTIFFS DID NOT NEED TO SHOW EITHER THAT A LICENSE WAS GRANTED OR THAT PLAINTIFFS TOOK OTHER STEPS TO PROTECT THEIR PROPERTY TO BE ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS’ VIOLATION OF BUILDING CODE SECTION 3309.4 (SECOND DEPT).
ACKNOWLEDGING DEBT IN BANKRUPTCY PLAN RENEWED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS WHICH STARTED TO RUN UPON GRANT OF DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY.
MOTION, MADE BY PLAINTIFF’S NEW COUNSEL, TO VACATE A STIPULATION ENTERED INTO BY PRIOR COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PRIOR COUNSEL HAD THE APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE STIPULATION AND PLAINTIFF CAN NOT LATER ARGUE PRIOR COUNSEL LACKED AUTHORITY (SECOND DEPT).
TERMINATION OF OUT OF WORK SCHOOL DISTRICT EMPLOYEE PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE LAW IS NOT ARBITRABLE, PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

RESETTLEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS PROPER ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF CORRECTING... THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT AS A MATTER OF LAW SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN...