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A Party Which Is Merely a Possible Beneficiary of a Charitable Trust Does Not Have Standing to Bring an Action to Enforce the Trust

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court finding that the plaintiff Historical Society did not have standing to bring an action seeking a declaratory judgment re: the intent of the grantor of a charitable trust.  At stake are trust assets of $81 million distributed to a charitable foundation (Foundation) set up by the grantor.  The Foundation was set up to sponsor and encourage historical societies. Plaintiff Historical Society sought a declaratory judgment that it was a beneficiary of the trust. The Second Department held that Supreme Court should have dismissed the complaint, explaining that the attorney general is responsible for representing charitable trust beneficiaries and there was no indication the plaintiff Historical Society was a party with a “special interest” entitling it to sue for enforcement on its own behalf:

In an action for the enforcement of a charitable trust, EPTL 8-1.1(f) provides that “[t]he attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries of such dispositions for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes and it shall be his [or her] duty to enforce the rights of such beneficiaries by appropriate proceedings in the courts.” A party with a special interest in the enforcement of the trust may have standing to commence such an action; however, “one who is merely a possible beneficiary of a charitable trust, or a member of a class of possible beneficiaries, is not entitled to sue for enforcement of the trust” … . This “special interest” is found by looking to the trust’s chartering documents to discern the purpose of the trust, and whether there is a class of intended beneficiaries that is entitled to a preference and is sharply defined and limited in number … .

In support of their motion, the appellants submitted the Foundation’s certificate of incorporation … which states that the Foundation’s purpose includes educating the public about state and local history and encouraging and sponsoring existing and future historical societies. That document does not name the Historical Society as a beneficiary, nor does it name any beneficiary. [The grantor’s] will did not mention the Historical Society. Accordingly, the Historical Society was not part of a class of potential beneficiaries of the Foundation that is sharply defined and limited in number. Therefore, it lacked standing to commence this action … . Sagtikos Manor Historical Socy., Inc. v Robert David Lion Gardiner Found., Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 03342, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

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