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Construction Manager Not Liable Unless Delegated Authority of General Manager

In finding the action against a construction manager should have been dismissed because the construction manager had not been delegated the responsibilities of a general contractor, the Second Department wrote:

“Although a construction manager is generally not considered a contractor responsible for the safety of the workers at a construction site . . . it may nonetheless become responsible if it has been delegated the authority and duties of a general contractor, or if it functions as an agent of the owner of the premises” . ” A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured”… . The defendant … made a prima facie showing of its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing, through the admission of construction documents and agreements and the deposition testimony of the parties, that it had not been delegated the authority and duties of a general contractor, and did not have supervisory control and authority over the work being done … . McLaren v Turner Constr Co, 2013 NY Slip Op 02726, 2nd Dept, 4-24-13

 

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