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PLAINTIFF WAS PROVIDED WITH A LADDER WITHOUT RUBBER FEET WHICH SLID CAUSING PLAINTIFF TO FALL; PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION PROPERLY GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause action in this ladder fall case:

We agree with the Supreme Court’s determination granting that branch of the plaintiff’s motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action asserted against [defendant]. The plaintiff established, prima facie, [defendant’s] liability under Labor Law § 240(1) through the submission of a transcript of the plaintiff’s deposition testimony, which demonstrated that he was provided with a ladder that lacked rubber feet, and that the ladder, which was leaning against a wall, slid away from the wall, causing the plaintiff to fall to the ground … . Chapa v Bayles Props., Inc., 2020 NY Slip Op 00397, Second Dept 1-22-20

 

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THE JURY WAS ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED TO CONSIDER A THEORY OF BURGLARY WITH WHICH DEFENDANT WAS NOT CHARGED; BURGLARY CONVICTIONS REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
PROPER VENUE FOR TWO LAWSUITS JOINED FOR TRIAL IS THE COUNTY WHERE THE FIRST LAWSUIT WAS FILED.
PLAINTIFF’S CROSSING IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT DRIVER IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN FROM THE CENTER LANE VIOLATED THE VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW AND CONSTITUTED THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT, PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSING PAPERS RAISED ONLY FEIGNED ISSUES OF FACT (SECOND DEPT).
THE FEDERAL CONSPIRACY-TO-DEAL-IN-FIREARMS STATUTE HAS DIFFERENT ELEMENTS THAN ITS NEW YORK EQUIVALENT AND THEREFORE CAN NOT BE THE BASIS OF A SECOND FELONY OFFENDER ADJUDICATION (SECOND DEPT).
IN THIS CHILD VICTIMS ACT CASE, THE ALLEGATION THE ABUSE TOOK PLACE IN 1982 – 1983 WAS SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO MEET THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OF THE COURT OF CLAIMS ACT (SECOND DEPT).
ALLEGEDLY OPERATING A TREE-TRIMMING BUSINESS WITHOUT A LICENSE AND ENTRUSTING THE TREE-TRIMMING TRUCK TO PLAINTIFF’S CO-WORKER, IF NEGLIGENT, WERE NOT PROXIMATE CAUSES OF PLAINTIFF’S INJURY, THE DANGEROUS CONDITION ON THE TRUCK WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S INJURY WAS OPEN AND OBVIOUS, AND THE ACCIDENT WAS AN ‘EXTRAORDINARY OCCURRENCE,’ SO THERE WAS NO DUTY TO WARN (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK DID NOT PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS’ DEFAULT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

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