You are here: / / A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM...
,

A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined that the clause of a contract indicating construction of the contract was governed by New York law did not incorporate a specific statutory requirement, here a requirement of the Lien Law:

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify which, if any, provision or provisions of the [CM agreement] were purportedly breached. Unlike the Development and Lease Agreements — to which plaintiff is not a party — the CM Agreement contains no express provision requiring compliance with the Lien Law. Plaintiff nevertheless maintains that section 5 of the Lien Law should be “read into” the CM Agreement because the contract is governed by New York law. Specifically, plaintiff points to section 17.3 of the CM Agreement, which provides that “[t]he construction, validity and performance of [the CM Agreement] shall be exclusively governed by the laws of the State of New York, excluding any provisions or principles thereof which would require the application of the laws of a different jurisdiction.” However, this is a typical choice-of-law provision that we do not read as imposing a contractual obligation here. The mere fact that an agreement, and disputes arising thereunder, are governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction does not transform all statutory requirements that may otherwise be imposed under that body of law into contractual obligations, and we decline to interpret the CM Agreement as “impliedly stating something which [the parties] have neglected to specifically include” … . Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02828, CtApp 4-26-18

​CONTRACT LAW (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACT LAW, CHOICE OF LAW, A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/LIEN LAW (CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, ERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))

You might also like
THE NYS AND NYC “RIGHT TO RECORD ACTS,” WHICH GIVE CITIZENS THE RIGHT TO RECORD POLICE ACTIVITIES, DO NOT ALLOW RECORDING IN PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE POLICE-STATION LOBBIES (CT APP).
Failure to Read Jury Notes to Counsel Before Calling in the Jury Was Not a Mode of Proceedings Error—The Error, Therefore, Must Be Preserved by Objection
DEFENDANT APPEARED IN COURT WITH A SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL WHO INFORMED THE COURT ANOTHER LEGAL AID LAWYER WAS BEING ASSIGNED TO DEFENDANT’S CASE; DEFENDANT WAS NOT “WITHOUT COUNSEL” WITHIN THE MEANING OF CPL 30.30; THE ASSOCIATED SPEEDY-TRIAL TIME-PERIOD SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHARGED TO THE PEOPLE, NOT THE DEFENDANT (CT APP). ​
REVERSING THE FOURTH DEPARTMENT WITHOUT OPINION OR MEMORANDUM DECISION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD QUESTIONS OF FACT PRECLUDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS’ FAVOR IN THIS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION (CT APP).
ONCE AN ACTION TO RECOVER THE PRINCIPAL OF A BOND IS TIME-BARRED, THERE IS NO LEGALLY COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR POST-MATURITY INTEREST (CT APP).
RESOLVING A SPLIT OF AUTHORITY, THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD THE ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD (AFC) HAS THE AUTHORITY TO APPEAL A CUSTODY DETERMINATION (CT APP).
RESIDENTIAL AREA OF MIXED USE BUILDING COULD NOT BE ACCESSED FROM WHERE DEFENDANT ENTERED, BURGLARY (ENTRY OF DWELLING) CONVICTION REVERSED.
THE EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT INTENDED TO STEAL TWO CANS OF RED BULL WHEN HE ENTERED THE CVS; THE DISSENT ARGUED THE EVIDENCE OF FELONY BURGLARY WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT, NOTING THAT THE PROSECUTOR COULD HAVE CHARGED PETTY LARCENY OR TRESPASS, THEREBY SAVING THE STATE THE MILLION DOLLARS IT COST TO INCARCERATE THE HOMELESS, MENTALLY ILL AND DRUG-ADDICTED DEFENDANT FOR AN ATTEMPT TO STEAL ITEMS WORTH $6 (CT APP).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’... ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY...