You are here: / / A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM...
,

A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, affirming the Appellate Division, determined that the clause of a contract indicating construction of the contract was governed by New York law did not incorporate a specific statutory requirement, here a requirement of the Lien Law:

Plaintiff’s complaint does not identify which, if any, provision or provisions of the [CM agreement] were purportedly breached. Unlike the Development and Lease Agreements — to which plaintiff is not a party — the CM Agreement contains no express provision requiring compliance with the Lien Law. Plaintiff nevertheless maintains that section 5 of the Lien Law should be “read into” the CM Agreement because the contract is governed by New York law. Specifically, plaintiff points to section 17.3 of the CM Agreement, which provides that “[t]he construction, validity and performance of [the CM Agreement] shall be exclusively governed by the laws of the State of New York, excluding any provisions or principles thereof which would require the application of the laws of a different jurisdiction.” However, this is a typical choice-of-law provision that we do not read as imposing a contractual obligation here. The mere fact that an agreement, and disputes arising thereunder, are governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction does not transform all statutory requirements that may otherwise be imposed under that body of law into contractual obligations, and we decline to interpret the CM Agreement as “impliedly stating something which [the parties] have neglected to specifically include” … . Skanska USA Bldg. Inc. v Atlantic Yards B2 Owner, LLC, 2018 NY Slip Op 02828, CtApp 4-26-18

​CONTRACT LAW (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CIVIL PROCEDURE (CONTRACT LAW, CHOICE OF LAW, A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS (A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM ALL NEW YORK STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS INTO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, HERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))/LIEN LAW (CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS, ERE THE CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT CONTRACT DID NOT MENTION BOND REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE LIEN LAW AND THE CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION COULD NOT BE USED TO READ THE LIEN LAW REQUIREMENT INTO THE CONTRACT (CT APP))

You might also like
DEFENDANT MAY NOT APPEAL OR COLLATERALLY ATTACK AN “ILLEGALLY LENIENT” SENTENCE BECAUSE THE SENTENCE DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE DEFENDANT (CT APP).
THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE RELIABILITY OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, MATTER SENT BACK FOR REVIEW OF THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT’S STATEMENT MADE BEFORE THE ISSUING MAGISTRATE (CT APP)
THE EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL INJURY WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE ASSAULT SECOND CONVICTION (CT APP).
Allowing a Detective Who Was Involved in the Investigation of Defendant’s Case to Testify as an “Expert” Was Error (Harmless Here However)–Although the Detective Was Ostensibly to Testify as an Expert Who Could “Translate” Code Words Used in Recorded Conversations, His Testimony Extended into Many Areas Which Did Not Involve Code Words, Thereby Imbuing HIs Entire Testimony with an Aura of Expertise—Such Improper “Expert” Testimony Usurps the Jury’s Role
Appellate Division Should Have Allowed Respondent to Answer Petition After Dismissal of the Petition Was Reversed by the Appellate Division
Attorney General’s Civil Suit Against Former Officers of AIG Survived Summary Judgment
DEFENSE COUNSEL’S DECISION TO FOREGO A REQUEST TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION HEARING BASED UPON TRIAL TESTIMONY WAS SUPPORTED BY A SOUND STRATEGIC REASON, COUNSEL WAS THEREFORE NOT INEFFECTIVE.
COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO APPROVE CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT WHICH DID NOT GIVE OUT OF STATE SHAREHOLDERS THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT.

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’... ALLEGATIONS OF SEX OFFENSES OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS ACQUITTED AT TRIAL PROPERLY...