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You are here: Home1 / Corporation Law2 / DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’...
Corporation Law, Limited Liability Company Law, Workers' Compensation

DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER, THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined that the defendant was the alter ego of plaintiff’s employer and therefore plaintiff’s only remedy for the on the job injury was under the Workers’ Compensation Law:

Generally, employees injured in the course of their employment may recover against their employers only under the Workers’ Compensation Law … . Workers’ Compensation Law § 29(6) expressly provides that “[t]he right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee” … . The exclusive remedy provisions also bar employees from seeking damages from “alter egos” of their employers … .. The alter ego rule applies when one of the entities in question controls the other or when the two entities operate as a single integrated entity … . A mere showing that the entities are related—by, for example, sharing officers or ownership—is insufficient… .

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that it was an alter ego of the plaintiff’s employer by submitting evidence that, among other things, in addition to owning the premises, it was the sole owner and manager of the limited liability company that was the plaintiff’s employer, that the plaintiff’s employer was formed to provide bus drivers for the defendant’s pupil transportation business, and that the two entities shared the same Workers’ Compensation insurance policy … . Clarke v First Student, Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op 02766, Second Dept 4-25-18

​WORKER’S COMPENSATION LAW (DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))/CORPORATION LAW (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, ALTER EGO, DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))/ALTER EGO  (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DEFENDANT WAS THE ALTER EGO OF PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER,THEREFORE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION WAS THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE PLAINTIFF WHO WAS INJURED ON THE JOB (SECOND DEPT))

April 25, 2018
Tags: Second Department
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PLAINTIFF RECORDED HER DEED AND MORTGAGE PRIOR TO THE RECORDING OF A MORTGAGE... A GENERIC NEW YORK CHOICE OF LAW PROVISION IN A CONTRACT DOES NOT TRANSFORM...
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