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THE STOP OF DEFENDANT’S CAR WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION; THE REPORT THAT A SUSPICIOUS CAR WAS FOLLOWING SOMEONE DID NOT DESCRIBE THE CAR AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT FOLLOWING ANYONE WHEN STOPPED; THE PROOF AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING DID NOT DEMONSTRATE DEFENDANT WAS TRESPASSING BY DRIVING ON THE PRIVATE ROAD, WHICH WAS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STOP RELIED UPON BY SUPREME COURT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion to suppress a gravity knife seized by a police officer after a traffic stop should have been granted. The officer received a report of a “suspicious vehicle following someone” without any description of the vehicle. The officer eventually stopped defendant’s car, which was moving slowly but was not following anyone. After the stop the officer saw the knife inside the car, but did not recognize it as a gravity knife until he picked it up. Supreme Court found the stop justified because defendant was trespassing by driving on a private road. However that theory was not raised at the suppression hearing and no evidence other than an ambiguous sign on an open gate suggested driving on the road would constitute trespassing:

The evidence at the hearing established that at the time Officer Paolillo stopped the defendant’s vehicle on Valley Road, the defendant was not following anyone, and was merely driving slowly down the road. In the initial call to the police, there was no vehicle description provided, and thus Officer Paolillo could not have known if this was the vehicle which had been observed following someone. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion, the testimony at the hearing did not establish that Valley Road was private property upon which trespass was forbidden. Officer Paolillo did not testify that he suspected the defendant of criminal trespass, or that Valley Road was a private road. When asked who generally uses the road, the officer testified “mainly the residents.” When asked how the traffic conditions were on the road, the officer testified “[v]ery light. Like I said, if anybody is down there, it’s basically they live down there.” The officer described that there were gates on the side of the road, which were open, and a sign which states “North Country Colony, Private Property, No Trespassing.” However, the officer was not asked whether this sign referred to the roadway itself or the residential properties located thereon. The officer provided no testimony which could have allowed the court to conclude that if someone was simply driving on Valley Road, it would be an act of trespass. Additionally, based upon the officer’s testimony, it was clear that Valley Road is not a dead end, but rather it has outlets to other roads.

Since there was nothing observed by Officer Paolillo which could have allowed him to conclude that criminal activity was at hand, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant’s vehicle … . People v Ahmad, 2021 NY Slip Op 02404, Second Dept 4-21-21

 

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