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THE ALLEGATIONS THAT DEFENDANT’ GRABBED PLAINTIFF’S SHOULDERS AND TOUCHED PLAINTIFF’S CHEEKS DID NOT STATE CAUSES OF ACTION FOR TORTIOUS “FORCIBLE TOUCHING” OR FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS; COMPLAINT DISMISSED OVER AN EXTENSIVE DISSENT (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Webber, over an extensive dissent, reversing Supreme Court, determined this lawsuit alleging a tortious “forcible touching” and intentional infliction of emotional distress should have been dismissed:

Plaintiff alleges that during the summers from 2000 through 2003, he worked in the wardrobe department of Roanoke Island Historical Association (RIHA), where defendant Long also worked. According to plaintiff, during that period there were numerous instances where Long committed acts of sexual misconduct toward plaintiff. The most egregious occurred in 2002, when Long engaged in nonconsensual sex with plaintiff while plaintiff was intoxicated. Plaintiff alleges that six years later, in 2008, after not having had any contact with Long, he briefly encountered Long in a public costume shop where Long grabbed plaintiff’s shoulders and touched plaintiff’s cheeks. * * *

Supreme Court erred in denying defendant Long’s motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211, as defendant established that plaintiff’s allegations do not “fit within any cognizable legal theory” … . Plaintiff failed to properly allege facts sufficient to establish a tort that would constitute forcible touching under Penal Law § 130.52(1). Long’s alleged acts of grabbing plaintiff’s shoulders and touching his cheeks “with the intimacy of a grandmother greeting her grown grandchild” were not, under the circumstances, sexual or intimate in nature, as required by the statute.

Penal Law § 130.52(1) was enacted in 2000. It states that “a person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person, or for the purpose of gratifying the actor’s sexual desire.” “[F]orcible touching includes squeezing, grabbing or pinching” … . * * *

Plaintiff’s shoulders and cheeks did not constitute “sexual or intimate parts” that were “sufficiently personal or private that [they] would not be touched in the absence of a close relationship between the parties” … . Thus, Long’s acts of grabbing plaintiff’s shoulders and touching his cheeks were not, under the circumstances, sexual or intimate in nature, as necessary to state a claim for forcible touching … . Watson v Roanoke Is. Historical Assn., 2026 NY Slip Op 02949, First Dept 5-12-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into the allegations necessary to state a cause of action for tortious “forcible touching.”

 

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