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DEFENDANT WAS TOLD HE FACED A 45-YEAR SENTENCE AFTER TRIAL WHEN THE ACTUAL SENTENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN CAPPED AT 20 YEARS; DEFENDANT’S DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY WAS NOT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY MADE (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, vacating defendant’s guilty pleas, determined defendant’s pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because was told he could be sentenced to 45 years after trial when the sentence would have been capped at 20 years:

Defendant was told that he faced the possibility of serving three 15-year sentences, to run consecutively, if he chose to proceed to trial, when at most he was facing 20 years because of the statutory cap … . Thus, he was weighing a 9-year plea offer against what he was told was a maximum of 45 years’ imprisonment. Because defendant was not told about the capping statute, he did not have a “full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences” … .

This 25-year disparity between the true legal sentence and the sentence defendant was told he could receive was so significant alone as to render his plea involuntary … . As defendant explained in his affidavit, submitted in support of his CPL 440.10 motion, the prospect of spending 45 years in prison—and dying there—factored into the 42-year-old’s calculation of the relative pros and cons of accepting the plea … . People v Buchanan, 2021 NY Slip Op 03386, First Dept 5-27-21

 

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