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THE INDICTMENT DID NOT INDICATE THE SPECIFIC SUBDIVISION OF THE STATUTE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED WITH VIOLATING, A JURISIDICTIONAL DEFECT WHICH WAS NOT CURED BY AN AMENDMENT; CONVICTION REVERSED AND INDICTMENT DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing defendant’s conviction, determined the indictment was defective because it did not indicate the specific statutory subdivision defendant was accused of violating:

… [W]e agree with defendant that the count of the indictment under which he was convicted was jurisdictionally defective and that the court should not have amended the indictment at the People’s request. While the jurisdictional requirements of an indictment count are ordinarily met by an allegation that the defendant “violated the terms of a specific statute designated by name and section” … , that rule does not apply where, as here, the statute at issue allows for commission under discrete subdivisions and there is no specific allegations regarding the subsection that the defendant allegedly violated … . The second count of the indictment charging defendant with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree under Penal Law § 265.02(1), could be satisfied by proof that defendant committed the “bump-up” crime of fourth-degree criminal possession of a weapon (Penal Law 265.01) in one of four ways, without specifically alleging the provision that defendant violated. Further, the amendment had the effect of “curing . . . a failure . . . to charge or state an offense” or the “legal insufficiency of the factual allegations,” both of which are prohibited by CPL 200.70(2).

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is vacated and the indictment dismissed. People v Jones, 2026 NY Slip Op 02214, First Dept 4-14-26

Practice Point: If the statute allows for commission of the offense under discrete subdivisions, the specific subdivision under which defendant is charged must be indicated in the indictment. Failure to indicate the subdivision is a jurisdictional defect which apparently cannot be cured by amendment.

 

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