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THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT WHETHER PLAINTIFF WAS TERMINATED FROM HIS EMPLOYMENT BASED ON “FAMILIAL STATUS” AND “CAREGIVER” DISCRIMINATION PURSUANT TO THE NYS AND NYC HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined the causes of action for “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination under the Human Rights Law should not have been dismissed in this wrongful termination action:

… [T]he record presents issues of fact as to plaintiff’s familial and caregiver status causes of action under the State HRL [Human Rights Law], which prohibits discrimination based on “familial status,” including against “any person who . . . has a child or is in the process of securing legal custody” of a child (Executive Law §§ 292[26][a], 296[1][a]), and the City HRL, which prohibits discrimination based on “caregiver status” (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-107[1][a]). On July 11, 2016, the day before DSC’s [defendant’s] decision to put plaintiff on probation, plaintiff attended a hearing in a custody proceeding regarding his daughter. According to plaintiff, Richard Greenberg, DSC’s co-chief investment officer, questioned whether plaintiff “was sure [he wanted] to do this” (that is, to participate in custody proceedings) and encouraged him to “[g]ive up on [his] daughter.” In addition, at plaintiff’s year-end review meeting, which plaintiff recorded, Greenberg gave him negative feedback about his job performance and stated, “I just want to know . . . is your heart still in it, you know? . . . I mean you’ve got all these things going on.”

Additionally, in January 2017, Jane Park, the firm’s director of business development and client relations, authored a memo for Smith and Greenberg that discussed whether to disclose to firm clients that a more junior investment analyst had received firm equity while plaintiff had not. The memo posited telling clients, as one option, that plaintiff “is going through some personal issues which make[] the current timing less than ideal for ownership disbursement.” Park testified at her deposition that she was referring to the fact that plaintiff was “distracted” because of his divorce and custody fight. …

Taken together, the evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude that defendants’ proffered reasons for denying plaintiff equity and ultimately terminating him were “false, misleading, or incomplete,” and that plaintiff was, in fact, terminated on the basis of his familial or caregiver status … . Mezinev v Donald Smith & Co., 2026 NY Slip Op 02209, First Dept 4-14-26

Practice Point: Consult this decision for insight into what constitutes “familial status” and “caregiver” discrimination in the context of an alleged wrongful termination of employment pursuant to the NYS and NYC Human Rights Law.

 

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