You are here: / / THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, IMPOSED AN INJUNCTION AND DETERMINED...
,

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, IMPOSED AN INJUNCTION AND DETERMINED ISSUES OF FACT; NO MOTION WAS BEFORE THE COURT AND NO HEARING WAS HELD (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the judge should not have, sua sponte, imposed an injunction on defendant and determined issues of fact without a motion before the court and without holding a hearing:

The Supreme Court, after a status conference … , issued an order, sua sponte, … which, … directed the defendant … to take all steps necessary to obtain a permit from the Department of Buildings to complete the work on one of the subject properties and expedite repairs to that property, including the submission of new plans by the defendant … .

Since no motion was pending before it, the Supreme Court should not have, sua sponte, and without a hearing, imposed an injunction on the defendant and determined issues of fact … . “A court is generally limited to noticed issues that are the subject of the motion before it” … . … The plaintiffs did not move for an injunction … and the court did not hold a hearing … . City of New York v Quadrozzi, 2020 NY Slip Op 07857, Second Dept 12-23-20

 

You might also like
IN THIS LADDER-FALL CASE, DEFENDANT PROPERTY MANAGER DID NOT DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF CONTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF THE DANGEROUS CONDITION OR THAT IT LACKED CONTROL OVER THE WORK SITE; THE LABOR LAW 200 AND COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE CAUSES OF ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED; IN ADDITION PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS LABOR LAW 240(1) CAUSE OF ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
THE BANK DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ALLONGE WAS FIRMLY AFFIXED TO THE NOTE AND THEREFORE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE STANDING TO BRING THE FORECLOSURE ACTION (SECOND DEPT).
THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE THE ABSENCE OF A LEFT TURN TRAFFIC SIGNAL WAS BASED ON A STUDY FINDING THE SIGNAL WAS NOT WARRANTED; THEREFORE THE CITY DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT WAS ENTITLED TO IMMUNITY IN THIS HIGHWAY-PLANNING ACTION BY A PEDESTRIAN WHO WAS STRUCK BY A VEHICLE MAKING A LEFT TURN (SECOND DEPT).
EVEN THOUGH THE PROCEEDS OF A TRUST HAD BEEN DISTRIBUTED TO DECEDENT BEFORE HIS DEATH, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER DECEDENT RETAINED THE PROCEEDS AT THE TIME OF DEATH; IF SO, PURSUANT TO THE WILL, THE BEQUEST DID NOT LAPSE AND THE PROCEEDS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE NAMED BENEFICIARIES (SECOND DEPT).
THE NOTICE OF FORECLOSURE WAS SENT TO DEFENDANT IN AN ENVELOPE WHICH INCLUDED OTHER NOTICES, A VIOLATION OF RPAPL 1304 (SECOND DEPT).
DRIVER/OWNER OF THE MIDDLE VEHICLE IN THIS CHAIN-REACTION REAR-END TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CASE IS NOT LIABLE (SECOND DEPT).
Although Not the Case Here, the Court Explained How a Collision Between a Vehicle Entering the Roadway and a Vehicle Which Is In the Roadway (and Has the Right-of-Way) Can Possibly Have Two Proximate Causes
MALPRACTICE ACTION AGAINST A DOCTOR PROPERLY SEVERED FROM A NEGLIGENT HIRING AND RETENTION ACTION AGAINST THE DOCTOR’S EMPLOYER (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, INCREASED A PENALTY TO WHICH THE PARTIES... THE DECRETAL PARAGRAPH OF THE APPELLATE DECISION REMITTING THE MATTER FOR RETRIAL...