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COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF.

The Second Department determined the county could not be held liable for flooding by a brook which overflowed its banks. There was not special relationship between the county and the plaintiff:

“[A] municipal corporation is not liable for failure to restrain waters between banks of a stream or to keep a channel free from obstructions it did not cause. Absent any special duty owed to the private landowners, a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for failing to provide adequate flood protection” … . Here, the County demonstrated that it did not owe a special duty to the plaintiff, and that the overflow was caused by natural phenomena, rather than its conduct. In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Kimball Brooklands Corp. v County of Westchester, 2016 NY Slip Op 07297, 2nd Dept 11-9-16

MUNICIPAL LAW (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/IMMUNITY (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/NEGLIGENCE (FLOODING, COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (FLOODING, COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF)/FLOODING (COUNTY NOT LIABLE FOR FLOODING, NO SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF

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