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A DEFAULT JUDGMENT CANNOT EXCEED IN AMOUNT OR DIFFER IN THE KIND OF RELIEF DEMANDED IN THE COMPLAINT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the default judgment must be vacated because the judgment awarded relief which was not requested in the complaint:

“A default judgment cannot exceed in amount or differ in the kind of relief from that demanded in the complaint” … . Moreover, “‘at an inquest, the court may not permit amendments of the pleadings which would broaden the scope of the inquest and increase the amount of damages provable by the plaintiff'” … . Here, the complaint only sought damages … in the principal sum of $20,357. Accordingly, the judgment must be vacated and the matter remitted … for entry of an amended judgment limiting the award … to the amount originally demanded in the complaint. Deutsch v Levy, 2025 NY Slip Op 05790, Second Dept 10-22-25

Practice Point: A default judgment cannot exceed in amount or differ in the kind of relief requested in the complaint.​

 

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