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DEFENDANT’S CONVICTION WAS REVERSED AND DEFENDANT APPLIED FOR BAIL; SUPREME COURT DENIED THE REQUEST WITHOUT THE REQUIRED EXPLANATION AND WITHOUT MAKING THE REQUIRED FLIGHT RISK DETERMINATION; DEFENDANT FILED A HABEAS CORPUS PETITION; PETITION HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING THE ISSUANCE OF A NEW SECURING ORDER (CT APP).

The Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate Division, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Halligan, over a two-judge concurring opinion, determined the habeas petition should be held in abeyance and a new securing order which complies with Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 510.10 should be issued:

While awaiting retrial after his criminal conviction was reversed on appeal, defendant Diego Guerra applied for a new securing order under the current version of the bail law. That statute requires a court to “make an individualized determination” as to the defendant’s flight risk and to “explain the basis for its determination and its choice of securing order on the record or in writing” (CPL 510.10 [1]; see also 530.40 [4]). Supreme Court ordered the defendant remanded to custody but neither explained that decision nor made an explicit determination as to flight risk.

Defense counsel filed this habeas petition in the Appellate Division, and we now review that Court’s dismissal of the writ. We conclude that Supreme Court abused its discretion by failing to make an individualized flight risk determination and to explain both the basis for that determination and the choice of securing order, as required by statute. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the Appellate Division for issuance of a new securing order in compliance with CPL 510.10. People ex rel. Kon v Lynelle Maginley-Liddie, 2025 NY Slip Op 05785, CtApp 10-21-25

Practice Point: Pursuant to CPL 510.10, in denying a request for bail, the judge must make an individualized flight-risk determination and explain the basis of that determination and the choice of securing order. The failure to comply with those statutory requirements is an abuse of discretion.

 

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