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DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE AN UNEQUIVOCAL REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF; THEREFORE THE JUDGE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT’S REQUEST WAS KNOWING, VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT; A TWO-JUSTICE DISSENT DISAGREED (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, affirming defendant’s conviction, determined he did not make an unequivocal request to represent himself. The two-justice dissent disagreed:

… [D]efendant did not unequivocally request to proceed pro se inasmuch as he only “ask[ed] to proceed pro se as an alternative to receiving new counsel,” thereby seeking to “leverage his right of self-representation in an attempt to compel the court to appoint another lawyer” … . Indeed, defendant repeatedly “made clear that he did not wish to proceed pro se,” and “couched [his requests] as a means to secure new counsel” … , including by stating that he had “no choice” but to represent himself if the court did not assign new counsel, and that he “d[id]n’t want to represent [him]self” but would do so if the court refused to appoint another attorney … . Defendant made no “standalone request to proceed pro se” … ; rather, all of his “requests to proceed pro se were made in the alternative; he sought to represent himself only because [the court] refused to replace . . . assigned counsel who had displeased him” … . A request to proceed pro se is equivocal where, as here, “it ‘does not reflect an affirmative desire for self-representation’ and instead shows that ‘self-representation was reserved as a final, conditional resort’ ” … . Inasmuch as defendant’s requests consisted of “equivocal and hesitant statements about proceeding pro se” … , the court’s duty to “make a searching inquiry . . . to determine whether [the] request[s] w[ere] knowing, voluntary, and intelligent” was not triggered … . People v Davis, 2025 NY Slip Op 04300, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for a thorough discussion of what makes a defendant’s request to represent himself “unequivocal” (thereby by triggering the need for a searching inquiry by the judge into whether the request is knowing, voluntary and intelligent).

 

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