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A COURT CANNOT MANDATE A SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS EXERCISE FOR A CHILD (ORDERING THAT A CHILD ATTEND A SPECIFIC CHURCH FOR EXAMPLE); RATHER, THE COURT SHOULD DESIGNATE A PARENT TO HAVE DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY OVER A CHILD’S RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND EXCERCISE (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, determined the order that a child “shall attend the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints …” was unconstitutional in that it mandated specific religious exercise:

… [T]he court’s order that the parties’ middle child “shall attend the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints every Sunday” except for six Sundays per year when the mother has access with the child, is unconstitutional insofar as it mandates specific religious exercise … . … [W]e remit the matter to Family Court to designate which parent will have decision-making authority for that child’s religious education and practice. Matter of Clark v Strassburg, 2025 NY Slip Op 04390, Fourth Dept 7-25-25

Practice Point: It is unconstitutional for a court, in the context of a Family Court proceeding, to order that a child attend a particular church. The court should designate a parent to have decision-making authority over a child’s religious education and practice.

 

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