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THE BED OF A VAN IS NOT AN ELEVATED WORK SURFACE FOR PURPOSES OF LABOR LAW 240(1) (FOURTH DEPT).

The Fourth Department noted the the bed of a van is not considered an elevated work surface for purposes of Labor Law 240(1):

Plaintiff and defendant’s principal moved the loaner jack to the edge of the van bed in preparation for lifting the device onto a four-wheeled cart. Plaintiff was injured when he and defendant’s principal lifted the loaner jack to place it onto the cart. * * *

The bed of a truck or similar vehicle does not constitute an elevated work surface for purposes of Labor Law § 240 (1) … , and the protections of Labor Law § 240 (1) do not apply where a plaintiff is injured while unloading equipment from the bed of a vehicle … . Inasmuch as there is no dispute that plaintiff’s injury occurred as he helped lift the loaner jack from the bed of defendant’s vehicle, the court properly determined that Labor Law § 240 (1) does not apply. Triest v Nixon Equip. Servs., Inc., 2024 NY Slip Op 00714, Fourth Dept 2-9-24

Practice Point: Here the Fourth Department held that the bed of a van was not an elevated work surface for purposes of Labor Law 240(1).

 

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