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PLAINTIFF MADE A LEFT TURN IN FRONT OF DEFENDANT’S ONCOMING CAR WHEN DEFENDANT WAS FOUR CAR LENGTHS AWAY, DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED, PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATION THE TRAFFIC LIGHT WAS YELLOW DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT (FOURTH DEPT)

The Fourth Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendant’s motion for summary judgment in this intersection traffic accident case should have been granted. Plaintiff made a left turn in front of defendant. Plaintiff’s claim that defendant was proceeding through a yellow light did not raise a question of fact:

… [W]e conclude that the record establishes that plaintiff made a left turn in front of defendant’s oncoming vehicle, which was only four car lengths away from the intersection and traveling at the speed limit of 40 miles per hour. At that speed and distance, defendant entered the intersection with insufficient time to take evasive action to avoid the collision … . Thus, defendant’s vehicle was so close to the intersection as to constitute an immediate hazard to the left-turning plaintiff, and plaintiff was therefore required to yield the right-of-way to defendant (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1141).

In addition, plaintiff’s assertion that the traffic light facing her vehicle had changed from green to yellow just before she started to make her left turn does not raise a question of fact inasmuch as a yellow light would not deprive defendant of the right-of-way and confer it upon plaintiff … . Godwin v Mancuso, 2019 NY Slip Op 02248, Fourth Dept 3-22-19

 

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