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THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT HAVE DELEGATED ITS AUTHORITY TO SET A SCHEDULE FOR MOTHER’S PARENTAL ACCESS TO THE PARTIES IN THIS CUSTODY ACTION (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing (modifying) Family Court, held the judge should not have left it up to mother and the non-family-member (Pierce) who brought the custody petition to determine mother’s parental access:

… [A[ “court may not delegate its authority to determine parental access to either a parent or a child” … . Here, the Family Court improperly delegated the determination of the mother’s parental access to the mother and Pierce. The record reflects that the relationship between Pierce and the mother has deteriorated and reveals troubling interactions between the parties, including one alleged instance where Pierce prevented the mother from visiting the child during a scheduled visitation. Accordingly, we remit the matter … to expeditiously establish both a supervisor for the mother’s parental access with the child as well as a specific schedule for the mother’s parental access in accordance with the best interests of the child that shall be observed by both the mother and Pierce … . Matter of Pierce v Joyner, 2025 NY Slip Op 04250, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: The court cannot delegate its authority to set up a parental-access schedule to the parties in a custody action.

 

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