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PLAINTIFF TRIPPED OVER AN EMPTY MILK CRATE ON A CARPETED FLOOR; THE CONDITION WAS DEEMED “OPEN AND OBVIOUS” AS A MATTER OF LAW ENTITLING DEFENDANTS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined defendants were entitled to summary judgment in this slip and fall case on the ground the empty milk crate plaintiff tripped over was an “open and obvious” condition:

The accident occurred in the morning, during one of the plaintiff’s usual daytime shifts. As the plaintiff was walking in a hallway with carpeting she described as “reddish, green-ish . . . earth colors,” she tripped on an empty, black milk crate. By all accounts, the milk crate was an ordinary milk crate and it was not attached to the floor in any way … . * * *

… [T]he hotel defendants established … the empty milk crate was open and obvious, as it was readily observable by those employing the reasonable use of their senses, and was not inherently dangerous under all the existing circumstances … . Raspberry v Best W. JFK Airport Hotel, 2025 NY Slip Op 04264, Second Dept 7-23-25

Practice Point: This decision presents a rare example of a condition which caused a trip and fall, i.e. an empty milk crate on a carpeted floor, deemed “open and obvious” as a matter of law.​

 

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