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TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200.

The Second Department, in the course of a decision addressing the exclusivity of a Workers’ Compensation recovery and Labor Law 240(1), 241(6) and 200 causes of action, noted that tree cutting was not covered under Labor Law 240(1) and a pile of debris was not a structure within the meaning of Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6). The court further noted that defendant (LLC), as an out of possession landlord, was not liable under Labor Law 200 for either the manner in which work is done or a dangerous condition:

The Supreme Court … properly granted that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the LLC, as tree cutting and removal are not activities covered by those statutory provisions … , and the evidence established, as a matter of law, that the mound of old tennis court clay, sand, rocks, and other construction debris was not a “structure” under the Labor Law … . Moreover, the respondents established, prima facie, that the tree cutting and removal was ” routine maintenance outside of a construction or renovation context'” … . …

The Supreme Court also properly granted that branch of the respondents’ motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against the LLC. “Labor Law § 200 is a codification of a property owner’s common-law duty to provide workers at a site with a reasonably safe place to work” … . To the extent that the plaintiff’s claims are based on the manner in which the work was performed, the respondents established, prima facie, that the LLC did not have authority to supervise or control the means and method of the work … . Likewise, to the extent the plaintiff’s claims were based on a dangerous condition on the premises, by presenting the lease between the LLC and the camp, the respondents also established, prima facie, that the LLC, as an out-of-possession landlord, was not responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries … . The LLC relinquished control of the subject property to the camp and placed all responsibility for landscaping and maintenance work on the camp … . Although the LLC reserved a right of entry under the lease, here, this did not provide a sufficient basis on which to impose liability upon the LLC for injuries caused by a dangerous condition, as the condition did not violate a specific statute, nor was it a significant structural or design defect … . Derosas v Rosmarins Land Holdings, LLC, 2017 NY Slip Op 02019, 2nd Dept 3-22-17

LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW (TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/TREE CUTTING (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/STRUCTURE (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)/LANDLORD-TENANT (LABOR LAW-CONSTRUCTION LAW, TREE CUTTING NOT COVERED, PILE OF DEBRIS NOT A STRUCTURE, OUT OF POSSESSION LANDLORD NOT LIABLE UNDER LABOR LAW 200)

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