CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION (CSLI) SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE BECAUSE IT WAS PROCURED WITHOUT A WARRANT, ERROR HARMLESS HOWEVER, SENTENCES FOR CRIMINAL SEXUAL ACT AND CRIMINAL IMPERSONATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONCURRENT (SECOND DEPT).
The Second Department determined the cell site location information (CSLI) should not have been admitted because the information was procured without a warrant. The error was deemed harmless. The Second Department further determined the sentences for criminal sexual act and criminal impersonation should have been concurrent:
The defendant contends that the People violated his federal constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures (see US Const Amend IV) by obtaining his historical cell site location information (hereinafter CSLI) without first obtaining a warrant. Although the defendant did not object on this ground to the admission of the CSLI at trial, his contention has merit and should be considered in light of the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Carpenter v United States (_____ US _____, 138 S Ct 2206). Contrary to the People’s contention, under the circumstances, the trial court’s order requiring release of the CSLI under the Stored Communications Act (18 USC § 2703[d]), which order made no express finding of probable cause, was not effectively a warrant supported by probable cause … . …
As the People correctly concede, because criminal sexual act in the first degree (Penal Law § 130.50[1]) constituted one of the offenses and a material element of the other offense, criminal impersonation in the first degree (Penal Law § 190.26[1]), the trial court should not have imposed consecutive sentences on these convictions … . People v Taylor, 2019 NY Slip Op 03823, Second Dept 5-15-19