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THE INDUSTRIAL CODE PROVISIONS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF DO NOT APPLY TO A SLIPPERY SUBSTANCE ON A LADDER, REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF A LABOR LAW 241(6) CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing (modifying) Supreme Court, determined certain provisions of the Industrial Code did not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder, requiring the dismissal of a Labor Law 241(6) cause of action:

The court should have dismissed the Labor Law § 241 (6) claim … on the basis that the Industrial Code provisions on which plaintiffs rely are inapplicable or abandoned. Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (d) does not apply to this case because the ladder from which plaintiff fell “was not ‘a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface'” … . 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (2) do not apply because there is no evidence that Thomas “tripped over any materials, debris or equipment” … . 12 NYCRR 23-1.21 (b) (3) (iv) is limited to structural defects in ladders … and does not apply to the slippery substance on the ladder in this case … . D’Angelo v Legacy Yards Tenant LLC, 2025 NY Slip Op 02409, First Dept 4-24-25

Practice Point: A ladder is not a “floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface” within the meaning of the Industrial Code section 12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (d).

Practice Point: Industrial Code sections12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (2) address tripping over “materials, debris or equipment” and does not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder.

Practice Point: Industrial Code section 12 NYCRR 23-1.21 (b) (3) (iv) applies to structural defects in ladders and does not apply to a slippery substance on a ladder.

 

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PLAINTIFF’S INJURIES WERE NOT CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE SCAFFOLD OR A FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE SAFETY DEVICE, LABOR LAW 200, 240 (1) AND 241 (6) CAUSES OF ACTION PROPERLY DISMISSED (FIRST DEPT).
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