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THE USE OF POST-DISCHARGE AFFIDAVITS FROM TWO JURORS, CLAIMING JUROR CONFUSION, AS THE BASIS FOR THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE VERDICT WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE THERE WAS NO SUPPORT FOR THE CLAIMS IN THE RECORD; THE MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN DENIED (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined the motion to set aside the jury verdict should not have been granted. The motion was based upon affidavits from two jurors which were drafted after the jury was discharged. There was no support in the record for the claims made in the affidavits:

“It has long been the law that, with narrow exceptions, jury verdicts may not be impeached by probes into the jury’s deliberative process” …. Further, “jurors may not impeach their own verdict unless they have been subjected to outside influence” … . This principle, however, is subject to two exceptions. First, “where an error is made in reporting the verdict, the trial judge may, upon the unanimous affidavits or statements of the jurors, correct the judgment to conform to the actual verdict” … . Second, “where the record demonstrates substantial confusion among the jurors in reaching a verdict, the court must direct a new trial to prevent a miscarriage of justice to the litigants” … . However, “[t]he use of post-discharge juror affidavits to attack the verdict is ‘patently improper’ where the record is devoid of any evidence of external influence, juror confusion, or ministerial error in reporting the verdict” … .

… [Defendant] sought to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of apportionment of liability based upon post-discharge affidavits from two jurors indicating that the jury was confused regarding the apportionment of liability. However, the trial record is devoid of any evidence of juror confusion regarding the issue of apportionment of liability, and thus, the use of post-discharge affidavits from jurors to attack the verdict is patently improper … . Gleneida Med. Care, P.C. v DBG Mgt. Corp., 2025 NY Slip Op 02323, Second Dept 4-23-25

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an explanation of when a jury verdict may be impeached by probing into the jury’s deliberative process.

 

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