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THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEFENDANT DRIVER’S STRIKING A 12-YEAR-OLD PEDESTRIAN WAS THE PEDESTRIAN’S SUDDENLY RUNNING ONTO THE HIGHWAY (FIRST DEPT).

The First Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined this traffic-accident action stemming from defendant’s striking a 12-year-old pedestrian (J.W.) should have been dismissed. J.W. suddenly ran into defendant driver’s (Li’s) highway lane:

Li testified that he was driving south in the right lane of the Hutchinson River Parkway in the Bronx at about 45 miles per hour when he first saw J.W. standing 100 feet in front of him in a grassy area on the side of the highway to his right. Li testified that when the vehicle approached, J.W. made a “running gesture” and began to run towards the vehicle when it was approximately two car lengths away. Li did not brake or honk his horn, but did take his foot off the gas pedal and was in the process of moving into the left lane to move away from J.W. when J.W. entered the highway, at which point the front right side of the van struck him. Police conducted sobriety tests at the scene and allowed Li to drive the van from the scene. He did not receive a ticket, violation, or citation as a result of the collision. It is undisputed that pedestrians are prohibited from occupying the location where J.W. was traversing (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1229-a).

Defendants established prima facie that J.W.’s act of running into the highway unlawfully was the sole proximate cause of the collision … . Li’s testimony shows that he was confronted with a sudden and unforeseen situation in which he was forced to make a split second decision and could not “weigh alternative courses of action” such that “he cannot reasonably be held to the same conduct as one who has had full opportunity to reflect” … . “While it is often a jury question whether a person’s reaction to an emergency was reasonable, summary resolution is possible when the individual presents sufficient evidence to support the reasonableness of his or her actions and there is no opposing evidentiary showing sufficient to raise a legitimate question of fact on the issue” … . Danielle W. v Li, 2026 NY Slip Op 04821, First Dept 7-30-26

 

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