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PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED MORE TIME TO SERVE DEFENDANT UNDER EITHER THE “GOOD CAUSE” OR “INTEREST OF JUSTICE” CRITERIA (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department, reversing Supreme Court, determined plaintiff should not have been granted more time to serve the summons and complaint under either the “good cause” or “interest of justice” criteria:

Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a plaintiff is required to serve the summons and complaint within 120 days after commencement of the action. If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon the defendant within that time, “the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service” … . “To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service” … . Such a showing is not required to obtain an extension of time under the interest of justice standard, which is a broader standard intended to “‘accommodate late service that might be due to mistake, confusion or oversight, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant'” … . “The interest of justice standard requires a careful judicial analysis of the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests presented by the parties” … . In reaching its determination, “the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant” … .

Here, the plaintiff failed to establish good cause to extend the time to serve [defendant], as no evidence was offered that she attempted to serve him with reasonable diligence. Further, … the plaintiff failed to establish that an extension of time to serve … was warranted in the interest of justice. The plaintiff failed to offer any explanation for the eight-month delay in filing the affidavit of service, the delay in moving, among other things, for leave to enter a default judgment … , and the four-month delay in moving to extend the time to serve … after the defendants had cross-moved … to dismiss the complaint … for lack of personal jurisdiction. There is no evidence in the record that [defendant] had notice of the action during the 120-day period after the commencement of the action … . Druss v Scher, 2025 NY Slip Op 02318, Second Dept 4-23-25

Practice Point: Even though the statute of limitations had passed. plaintiff’s failure to exercise reasonable diligence precluded an extension of time to serve the defendant, under either the “good cause” or “interest of justice” criteria.

 

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