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THE DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT, IN A WRITING SIGNED IN OPEN COURT, TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF AN ALTERNATE JUROR AFTER DELIBERATIONS HAD BEGUN REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL; THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS UNREASONABLE AND UNDULY SUGGESTIVE REQUIRING DISMISSAL OF THE COUNTS RELATED TO ONE OF THE TWO ROBBERIES (SECOND DEPT). ​

The Second Department, reversing one of defendant’s robbery convictions and ordering a new trial, determined (1) a new trial is required because the judge did not obtain defendant’s written and signed consent to the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations had begun, and (2) the showup identification of the defendant was unreasonable and unduly suggestive, requiring dismissal of the counts relating to one of the two robberies (there was no identification testimony at the trial):

“Under CPL 270.35, once the jury has commenced deliberations an alternate juror may not be substituted for a regular juror unless the defendant consents to the replacement . . . in writing . . . signed by the defendant in person in open court in the presence of the court” … . * * *

… [T]the People failed to establish that the showup identification was conducted in close temporal proximity to the crime … . Further, there was no unbroken chain of events or exigent circumstances that justified the showup identification, as the defendant was already under arrest for the second robbery … .

… [T]he People failed to establish that the showup identification was not unduly suggestive. Here, prior to the showup identification, the complainant was informed by the police officers that they had someone in custody who matched the description provided by the complainant. During the showup identification, the defendant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back and there were one to two police officers near the defendant as he was treated by emergency medical service providers. While these factors alone do not necessarily render a showup identification unduly suggestive, when viewed cumulatively with other factors, including that the officers informed the complainant that the defendant committed another crime around the corner, that the defendant’s face was severely bruised and bleeding, and that it was “an active crime scene” with several surrounding officers dealing with witnesses “[y]elling and screaming,” the showup identification was unduly suggestive … . People v Simon, 2025 NY Slip Op 00117, Second Dept 1-8-25

Practice Point: A defendant’s consent to the substitution of an alternate juror after deliberations have begun must be in writing signed in open court.

Practice Point: Consult this decision for an example of a showup identification deemed unreasonable and unduly suggestive.

 

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