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THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT).

The Second Department determined the failure to resentence defendant in accordance with the plea agreement required that the defendant be given the opportunity to withdraw his pleas, not only to the charges in indictment on which he was resentenced, but also the charges in prior indictment from which the defendant had not appealed:

Here, the defendant contends that both of the underlying judgments should be reversed and the underlying guilty pleas vacated on the ground that the County Court deviated from the terms of the plea agreement by imposing an aggregate term of seven years’ imprisonment instead of the aggregate term of five years’ imprisonment that it had promised the defendant when he agreed to plead guilty. To the extent that the defendant seeks vacatur of the underlying pleas and reversal of the underlying judgments due to an alleged violation of the plea agreement, such a contention is not reviewable on this appeal since the defendant has only appealed from the resentence … . …

… [T]he County Court erred in resentencing the defendant to a period of postrelease supervision on the conviction of criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree that exceeded the period of postrelease supervision that had been promised to the defendant in connection with the plea agreement, without first affording the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty to that count … . Furthermore, inasmuch as the defendant’s plea of guilty on [the prior indictment], and his plea of guilty to the charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree under [the second indictment] were induced by the promise that the sentences on the two indictments would all run concurrently, the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his pleas of guilty under both of the indictments, for all three convictions … . People v Robinson, 2018 NY Slip Op 02490, Second Dept 4-11-18

​CRIMINAL LAW (SENTENCING, THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/PLEA AGREEMENTS  (SENTENCING, THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/SENTENCING (PLEA AGREEMENTS,  (SENTENCING, THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))/GUILTY PLEAS, WITHDRAWAL OF  (THE COURT’S FAILURE TO SENTENCE DEFENDANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT ON ONE INDICTMENT REQUIRED THAT THE DEFENDANT BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS TO THAT INDICTMENT AND ANOTHER INDICTMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL HAD BEEN TAKEN (SECOND DEPT))

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